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Constructing Citizenship through War
in the Human Rights Era
Timothy William Waters*
Abstract
War's historical relationship to the creation of territorial nation-states is well known,
but what empirical and normative role does war play in creating the citizen in a
modern democracy? Although contemporary theories of citizenship and human rights
do not readily acknowledge a legitimate, generativefunctionfor war - as evidenced by
restrictions on aggression, annexation of occupied territory, expulsions,
denationalization, or derogation of fundamental rights - an empirical assessment of
state practice, including the interpretation of international legal obligations, suggests
that war plays a powerfully transformative role in the construction of citizenship, and
that international law and norms implicitly accept this.
Dominant discourses on citizenship in the liberal and cosmopolitan traditions
focus on the individual as the unit of analysis and normative concern, and on his
rights against the state. At the same time, the choice of how to construct citizenship -
to whom to grant it or from whom to withhold it, and what content to give citizenship
- is closely linked to questions of security and identity: citizenship either presupposes
or purports to create some measure of common identity among citizens, and implies
obligations as well as rights. This chapter argues that, in assessing legal and moral
positions, this role - if not necessarily approved - must be accounted for to achieve a
fuller understanding of how peace, war and rights are related.
Human rights may be conceptualized as universal, but their application and
specific content are often mediated through the state, and therefore understanding
how states retain the ability to define the contours of citizenship, including through
the effects of war, is critical to an understanding of the actual scope of human rights
as a legal enterprise and a lived experience.
The article will examine the formal limits placed on war as an instrument that
could affect citizenship; then it will examine the evidence for war's continued effect
(through means such as differentiation between citizens and alien residents, expulsion
of aliens, assimilation of refugee flows, and border changes); then it will advance an
argument about how the factual effects of war interact with legal doctrine (such as
through selective definition and interpretation of wars, perfection of wartime changes
in peace treaties, and novel demographic changes introduced by peace treaties).
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The article considers the concepts of participation, loyalty, and treason; the
evidence and implications of wartime propaganda; the rules and practice governing
transfer of populated territory between sovereigns; the incentives that the laws of
war create for individuals' identification with the state; and the accommodation in
peace plans of demographic change wrought by war.
Principal reference is made to changes in citizenship status following the wars of the
former Yugoslavia, the Algerian decolonization, the postwar settlement of Europe, and
to the debates about the contours of citizenship in Israel and the Palestinian territories.
1. The Argument
War's historical relationship to the creation of territorial nation-states is well
known, but what role does war play in creating the citizen and state in
contemporary conditions of internationalized security and democracy? Very
little, we might suppose: The normative restrictions on war's scope to affect
citizen-state relationships are numerous, far-reaching, and powerful: most
prominently, the prohibitions of aggressive war, annexation of territory, and
settlement of one's own population's in occupied territory, coupled with
human rights law, make it nearly impossible, in normative terms,
unilaterally to effect changes in citizenship through war. Other traditional
methods of altering the demographic qualities of territory - such as
expulsion and mass denationalization - are similarly disfavored.
These restrictions are uncontroversial in law and are generally accepted in
policy circles as well. At a minimum, then, state rhetoric and practice has
retreated from the dispensation prior to the First World War, when the right
of conquest was an accepted practice, towards a position in which such acts
are done, if at all, rarely and in much more limited, even disguised forms.
But this should not blind us to evidence of war's continued operation
in the construction of political communities and identity. Although
contemporary theories of citizenship do not acknowledge a legitimate,
generative function for war (Martin 0. Heisler, 2005), an empirical
assessment of state behavior, including their interpretation of
international legal obligations, suggests that war continues to play a
persistent, at times powerfully transformative role in the construction of
citizenship. This role may be in some important sense irreducible,
something which law as a humanizing project cannot entirely exclude,
and which law's operators may in fact not necessarily wish to.
The choice of how to construct citizenship - to whom to grant it or
from whom to withhold it, and what content to give citizenship - is
closely linked to questions of security and identity: citizenship either
presupposes or purports to create some measure of common identity
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among citizens, which implies obligations as well as rights. This paper
argues that, in assessing legal and moral accounts of citizenship, this role
must be accounted for, if not necessarily approved - and that, going
further, there might be some minimum beyond which the defensive war-
making functions of the modern state may imply, even indicate, a limited
justification for altering the demography of a state.
The focus is war's effect on the formal institutions of citizenship - rules
and practice on membership, rights, duties of individuals in relation to the
state. It does not address the cultural and political contours of citizenship's
meaning; these are important questions, and closely linked to the questions
posed here about formal legal effects, as well as to debates between
universalist and particularist or differentialist views of citizenship,1 but this
paper concerns the ways in which law and war interact to create formal
changes to citizenship, membership, and affiliation that are recognized in
international law and international relations.
This paper considers, principally, the interaction of war-making with
international legal norms concerning displaced populations, and the
accommodation in peace plans of demographic changes wrought by war;
in addition, it draws on the rules and practice governing transfer of
populated territory between sovereigns and the incentives the laws of war
create for individuals' identification with the state. In particular, it argues
that the continuing fact of war combined with increasing commitments to
afford citizenship to all permanent residents of a given territory -
included populations displaced by war - operate to create a predictable
mechanism for the transference and assimilation of individuals, altering
the demography of both source and recipient states. It is this particular
interaction that forms the focus of this paper.
The effects described in this paper are, in some ways, quite obvious,
but it is a useful reminder that these obvious things materially affect the
constitution of citizenship. The philosophical and political study of
citizenship - so attentive to questions of democracy and participation,
transnationalism and globalization, identity and diversity (Martin 0.
Heisler, 2005), has largely ignored the problem of war, or assumed that,
1. See: "Citizenship," (Sec. 2.1), STANF. ENCYC. PHIL.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/#3. For purposes of this paper, we employ,
as a default, the universalist depiction of citizenship - with its assumption that the
benefits and duties of citizenship are normally equally accorded to all members - not as
necessarily more accurate, but as the more dominant, doctrinally cognizable depiction in
legal discourse about liberal democracies. See: MARSHALL, 1950.
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because war is so circumscribed in normative terms, there is little of
interest save the mobilizing role war plays in politics and identity
formation. But that is a mistake - those limitations are the point at which
one must begin the analysis, not a reason to end it.
I. Limits
In order to discern the role war plays today in the construction of
citizenship, we must first note the sea change that war's role in the
international system has undergone. That change has been clearly and
consistently in the direction of reducing the scope of war to effect large-
scale, legally cognizable demographic change.
Prior to the First World War, the right of a sovereign state to engage in
aggressive war, to conquer territory and incorporate it into its own territory
or otherwise occupy it was largely uncontested and uncontroversial.
(OPPENHEIM, 1905: 288) There were certain humanitarian restraints on the
conduct of war (though even these were very limited), but almost none on
the resort to war or on the sovereign's right to determine the dispensation
of people and territory after war. (GRABER, 1949) A given community -
itself the victim of aggressive attack - might complain about the enemy's
perfidy, or offer special reasons why this particular attack or seizure of
territory was unjust, but the idea that such actions were unacceptable as
such was largely an unavailable response. After all, in different
circumstances, the victim might do the very same thing itself.
This permissive dispensation began to change in the interwar period,
and by the early postwar period, the change was effectively completed.
Aggressive war has been outlawed, replaced by a global system of collective
security with an international legitimating institution, the United Nations.1
More broadly, international legal norms have decreased the scope in which
military action may be undertaken or in which its effects may be
assimilated. Even when a state may legitimately resort to force (as in self-
defense or as part of action authorized by the United Nations - U.N.
Charter, Chapter VII), its options are limited: it may not annex territory
that it conquers; it may occupy foreign territory, but doing so brings
1. U.N. Charter, Art. 2(4); U.N. Gen. Assembly, Declaration of Principles of International Law
(1970)("the territory of a state shall not be the objection of acquisition by another states
resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or
use of force shall be recognised as legal."). See: Shaw,1997: 341; McCOUBREY & WHITE, 1992:
17-138 (discussing prohibition of the use of force, non-aggression norms, self-defense and
collective security). For a discussion of this system's operation in its first two decades - the
period in which the contemporary normative structure was elaborated - See: BAILEY, 1982.
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considerable obligations and only limited opportunities to expand - the
occupier may not remove the extant population or settle its own population
on the territory, for example. (McCoubrey & White, 1992: 279-294)
Looking beyond rules with a specifically territorial aspect, the changed
normative landscape for states' behavior in conducting war - the jus in
bello - arguably limits their ability to alter their own or neighboring
states' populations. The development of human and minority rights and
international criminal law - themselves hardly apparent on the legal
landscape prior to the Great War - further restrict states' ability to alter
the demography of a population, or at least to use the most effective
methods to achieve that goal.
Thus there appears to have been a significant shift in the normative, or
at least predictive, expectations around which states organize their
behavior.1 The net effect of this trend is considerably greater limits on
states' ability to transform their own territory and citizenry, or that of other
states, through the instrument of war. But this pacific vision may require a
level of focus, or of generality, that elides some troubling particulars which
suggest a different set of effects and a different vision.
III. Evidence of Effect
First, we should note evidence of war's continuing effect on the legal
demographics of states' populations. We may divide the evidence into the
following categories: differentiation among populations in preparing for
war; refugee flows; changes in borders; and the fact of war's violence.
a. differentiation among resident populations in preparation for war
There is little traction for the idea that war, or preparation for it, allows states to
make ultimate distinctions between its own citizens that it might not otherwise
be allowed to make; at the same time, just such differences are evident in
practice, if one focuses somewhere just below the level of formal legality.
In at least one relevant instance, the difference is apparent on the
surface: Israel places different military obligations on its Arab and Jewish
populations. Jews (and Druze, apparently at their request) are legally
obliged to serve in the military, whereas the large Arab minority is not.
The pragmatic reason for this policy is clear enough: An expressly Jewish
state in a state of permanent hostility with several of its Arab neighbors,
and in occupation of territory inhabited by the close co-ethnics of its own
Arab population hardly trusts those Arabs to fight for its cause, and
1. See: "War," STANF. ENCYC. PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war.
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would be uncomfortable at the thought of giving them weapons, training
and access to strategic or operational planning.1
Relatively few states make the kind of explicit, formal distinctions that
Israel does, but in practice it is quite common that states discourage the
full and equal participation of their whole citizenry in the war-making
enterprise. The terms of military service - employing a standardized
language, for example - can effectively privilege certain groups and
exclude others; more broadly, disfavored groups may be conscripted but
not admitted in significant numbers into the middle and higher officer
ranks, creating a modern analogue to the great imperial and colonial
armies in which the natives served but did not command. In states with
ongoing civil unrest or conflicts, entire communities may in effect be
excluded or exempted from military service, because they are in open
rebellion or are the object of military operations.
And of course, where a state has a large non-citizen population, the
differential obligations that citizen and non-citizen have in regard to
defense (as to so many other things) may create an ethnically keyed
security policy. Many African states have large, quasi-permanent
populations of refugees, displaced persons, or illegal aliens who are
outside the formal state structures, even though their own security is
equally dependent on those structures as that of full citizens.2 The
consequences of not participating in defense - of not having membership
in the warrior class (Stephen Castles, 2007) - can be devaluation,
denigration, mistrust, marginalization, and exclusion - in brief the creation
of a hierarchical, tiered concept of the citizen. (Eliyahu Matza, 2007)
b. refugee flows
Far more significant than the relatively limited and opportunistic expulsion
of resident aliens, however, are the large refugee flows - including internally
displaced persons - that result from modern wars.3 Large refugee flows in
1. Presumably the Pentagon has more regular access to Israeli military planning than the
one-fifth of Israel's population that is Arab.
2. Israel provides an example here as well, with relation to the non-citizen residents of the
annexed areas of the West Bank around Jerusalem.
3. A refugee is defined as "[a] person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."-
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post-colonial conflicts often have a distinctly ethnic character - those who
flee are not a random sampling of the exporting state's population - and
while this might in some cases simply be a function of the unequal
distribution of ethnic groups across territory (so that, for example, a
localized conflict may affect one group more than others, just as an
earthquake or flood might), often that ethnic differentiation is not an
incident, but is an integral element of the conflict itself.
In a number of conflicts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, this pattern
of ethicized refugee flows consequent on war is well known; in many of
these conflicts, the numbers of internally displaced has been considerably
higher - though still within the borders of their state of citizenship, these
individuals are functionally identical to refugees, as equally removed from
the protection of the state, although without any alternative domicile. The
Balkan conflicts of the 1990s arguably were driven by demographic
considerations: their very purpose was to alter the ethnic composition of
the populations, and thus the production of refugees and the internally
displaced was a strategic war aim. And the Cisjordanian conflict is one of
the leading examples of demographic alteration through war which has
settled into a permanent refugee pattern.1
In many of these cases, the ethnicity of refugee flows must be
understood as a demographic consequence of war (or, again, as the
demographic raison de guerre) which, if allowed or supported, implies
sanction for the reconstitution of the population by war.
c. changes in borders and citizenship in consequence of war
While the international order has banished aggression and conquest,
reconstitution of international frontiers - and with them of political
communities - continues, most commonly through the division of states,
but occasionally through their integration as well. Some of these are
peaceful transformations approved through internally validated
deliberative processes, but others are violent and involuntary, or occupy
complex and ambiguous categories. The Soviet Union transmogrified into
15 sovereign states with separate citizenship; Yugoslavia has, to date,
€-Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, entry into force
22 April 1954, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o c ref.htm, as amended (Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967){Refugee Convention).
1. Even when the ethnic component is absent, war can generate large refugee flows, as with
the conquest of South Vietnam by North Vietnam, the Chinese Nationalist- Communist
conflict, the Spanish Civil War, and the Russian Revolution, each of which resulted in
large scale flight (and in some cases expulsion) of defeated ideological opponents.
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divided into six sovereign states and one international protectorate;
Ethiopia and Pakistan each divided into two sovereign states following
civil wars. In the integrative direction, a smaller number of states or
territories have merged - the two Vietnams, the two Yemens, China and
Tibet - following violent conflicts, as have a number of territories
normally defined in the context of decolonization, such as Morocco and
Spanish Sahara, or India and Goa.1 In each of these cases, individual
citizens of the prior states found their citizenship altered, through loss of
common political bonds or creation of new bonds.
d. the continuing fact of war, and of war's violence
We must also acknowledge that war itself alters the demography of states:
along with the differentiations that accompany the preparation for war and
the dislocations that are consequent of war (or are the reason for war), the
actual events of war may differentiate populations in patterned ways that
have lasting effects on the demography of states.
In some cases, the killing alone makes a significant difference: the
extermination of European Jews dramatically altered the demographic balance
in large areas of Poland, Hungary and the western Soviet Union. The Rwandan
genocide firther entrenched the numerical dominance of Hutus. Ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia was no mere incident of the fighting but itself a principal war
aim, one that was comprehensively realized, with dramatic effects on residential
patterns and all that follows from them: The dead and displaced no longer
participate in the life of the community or make demands upon it.
Most basically, it is clear, as a matter of evidence, that wars continue to
occur. The legalizing project of the 20 th century may have proscribed many
types and occasions of war, but it has not banished actual warfare, humanized
its fundamental savagery, or removed the incentives, logics, and emotions
that drive the resort to violence. (KORMAN, 1996: 305) To the degree that law
acknowledges or authorizes war and its effects, even retrospectively, it further
alters the contours of the prohibition. So: How are war's effects assimilated to
the normative international regime? Do our laws, norms, and practices in fact
sanction such acts? Do they facilitate or even perfect them?
1. Immediately after the Second World War territorial revisions occurred in both Europe and
Asia, with Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Finland, and Japan all
losing territory to other states, and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania losing all their territory.
These events arguably predated the frill development of the non-aggression/non-conquest
norm, but they do occur conveniently, uncomfortably, and opportunistically close to - indeed,
during - that process; Germany's loss of territory was not actually finalized until 1990.
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IV. The Interaction of War as Fact with Legal Doctrine
Despite the general prohibitions on aggressive war and conquest, there
are ways in which legal doctrines assimilate the facts of war to our
normative global order, and specifically assimilate the demographic
alterations war's violence creates to normatively approved definitions of
citizenship in the territorial state.
a. the general concept - regulating international war, preserving bordered citizenship
As noted above, a number of states and territories have merged or divided
as a direct consequence of violent conflict. Of course, the political and
doctrinal mechanics of division (or integration) are notionally unrelated
to war. Yet it would seem disingenuous to pretend that war and violent
conflict is immaterial to this process more generally. Other cases, after all,
were violent and coercive, and a naive view of the doctrinal field would
have one think that such things could not be recognized or tolerated. Yet
as the Yugoslav case illustrates, division and reconstitution of the state
and its population can be the very purpose of contestation and the
defining strategic element in the war-fighting enterprise. So the real
question involves those cases in which they are not peaceful: Where these
kinds of transformations are violent in nature, why do they not fall afoul
of the prohibitions against aggression and conquest?
First, some of these cases involved the division of existing states through
civil war or secession, as in Yugoslavia, Eritrea, and Bangladesh.
International law views the division of an existing state as a non-legal,
factual matter - and nothing in international law prohibits the division of a
state by its own people. (There is no recognized right to secession by sub-
state groups; still the absence of a right does not imply prohibition, but
rather the political nature of the question, and when secessionist groups
have successfully prosecuted wars, they have also achieved recognition.1)
Technically, therefore, this does not involved aggression by another state,
but that seems a thin distinction. At a minimum, we should acknowledge
that, in outlawing external aggression, the normative order has, in a sense,
fought last century's wars, but failed to say much about the internal
conflicts that (perhaps because of the prohibition) predominate today.
Even in those cases in which an external actor intervenes, as in
Vietnam, Bangladesh, Spanish Sahara, and Kosovo - and which therefore
should notionally fall squarely within the prohibition against aggression
and conquest - the violent transformations of war are assimilated,
1. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, Sup. Ct. Canada, 115 I.L.R. 537.
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through peace processes (that is, through treaties and other arrangements
that terminate hostilities) or through marginal interpretations of the
conflict as a justified exception to the general norm, such as for
decolonization or humanitarian intervention.
While the general prohibition has regulated the resort to war, it has
also preserved the principle that citizenship generally follows, such that
when, by whatever logic, a war is indeed approved, its demographic
consequences can be approved as well.
b. characterizing wars as other than conquest
In some cases, states engage in acts that, on a technical analysis, would be
characterized as aggression or conquest were it not for special pleading.
This includes revanchist claims related historically to a colonial conquest
as well as humanitarian interventions.
An anti-colonial revanchist war by its nature aims at a territorial-
political revision, and so in such cases, assuming one accepts the historical
claim, the change in territorial status is a necessary, even intended
consequence. The question, however, is the whether those claims are
merely pretextual. Morocco's claims to Spanish Sahara rely on an ancient,
controversial claim of title, which itself has imperial overtones of the very
kind that, we imagine, delegitimated colonial claims. India's claim against
Goa seems even more problematic, since there was not an 'India' in the
political sense prior to unification under the British Raj (in the way there
was a Morocco). Why did the otherwise universal principle of colonial uti
possidetis not apply to the Goan-British Indian frontier as well?
A more recent and more robust category is the claim of humanitarian
intervention, most prominently elaborated in Kosovo, in which the partition
of a sovereign state following its occupation by an international coalition has
recently been recognized by the major Western powers. What is of note is not
the permission to engage in fighting, but the territorial, demographic and
political consequences that follow. It is one matter to authorize a defensive or
humanitarian war, quite another to approve of changes to borders and
sovereignty that result. The aims of a defensive war are properly limited to
fending off the attack and perhaps to ensuring the aggressor is disabled from
re-initiating hostilities; (WALZER, 1977) it is not clear that, absent particularly
defined circumstances, it justifies permanent territorial revisions.1
1. Obviously, in the case of Israel, neither its permanent occupation nor its annexation of
West Bank areas adjacent to Jerusalem has been recognized by the broader international
community. I am not aware of a defensive war which has resulted in significant
territorial gain by the defending state, so this may be a currently empty category.
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Recognition of Kosovo both implicitly approves the initial war - itself
generally conceded to have been illegal' - and indicates the scope of
consequences that can follow such an intervention.
c. perfecting demographic change in peace treaties
Much of the violence and dislocation that occurs in war is either illicit or
is only licit in the context of the fighting, with the normative assumption
that when the war stops, the violence and dislocation will also come to
end. This is the very idea behind the principle that refugees - who are a
fact of war - are supposed to be allowed to return home after the war, for
example. However, often the formal termination of hostilities provides an
imprimatur for wartime demographic changes that effectively insulates
them against revision, providing legal sanction for illicit transformations.
Most saliently, while unilateral interventions and the conquest of territory
are prohibited, little prevents the mutual exchange of territories and
populations by willing sovereigns. (Shaw, 1997: 339-340) Yet when a state
divides in the immediate aftermath of a war, or while war is still ongoing, one
naturally questions how voluntary the decision really was. Ethiopia did not
voluntarily cede sovereignty over Eritrea (Dias, 2006), nor Pakistan over
Bangladesh; they did so at the termination of violent conflict (including, in
Bangladesh's case, direct foreign intervention by India). The severing of joint
citizenship ties resulting from these divisions were therefore consequences of
war, though ones for which we have found an acceptable doctrinal pathway.
The Vienna Convention prohibits treaties made under duress2, but that
general prohibition has never been extended to invalidate all treaties made in
termination of hostilities, even though, obviously, the losing party in a war
only accepts the treaty because of its military defeat. (Shaw, 1997: 339-340)
d. creating additional demographic change in peace plans
In addition to the effects of peace plans in approving wartime dislocations,
we must consider the special problem when a peace plan - quite apart
from approving what has already happened - creates additional effects
not actually achieved, or even necessarily contemplated, by the process of
war itself. We will consider a few examples in greater detail.
1. See: INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT, Executive Summary
(2000)("The Commission concludes that the NATO military intervention was illegal but
legitimate."). The international presence in Kosovo was approved, after the war, in
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).
2. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 LL.M.
679, Art. 52 (treaties are void if they have been procured by force).
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The Dayton Peace Accords,1 which brought the Bosnian War to an
end, not only sanctioned significant elements of the wartime division of
the country, but specified additional territorial transfers. (Radan, 2002)
The Accords provided for the right of refugee return, and in that sense
vindicated the existing orthodoxy proscribing violent demographic
change. However, other key provisions of the Accords arguably ran
contrary to the return obligations: these include the creation (or approval)
of the internal political structures and the highly decentralized, confederal
nature of the state agreed at Dayton, which ensured and entrenched the
ethnically exclusive regimes in control of various parts of the country.
(William Waters, 2004: 423-452) Ten years on, the demographic map of
Bosnia is radically altered - and formal governance structures, approved
in international treaties, track, identify, confirm and support those
alterations. As noted, the independence of Kosovo - in effect, the
partition of Kosovo - is not a necessary consequence of the war itself, and
therefore may be considered an added effect of the peace plan, including
Security Council Resolution 1244 which approved the international
protectorate and provided for a final status process which is still ongoing.
Similar arguments might be invoked in connection with the concluding
phase of the Algerian War, following immediately after the Evian Agreement
which provided for Algeria's independence, saw the flight of roughly 1.3
million European pieds noirs from Algeria - roughly ten percent of the
population. (Alistair Horne, 1977) The departure and denationalization of
the pieds noirs was not the mere perfection of war's effects as such; when
Evian was signed - when, in other words, France and the FLN agreed that the
new government would have the discretionary authority to denationalize the
pieds noirs - the pied noir population of more than one million was intact and
in situ, vested of citizenship in the state then holding sovereignty over the
place where they lived.2 Nor was this a case of the departure of a colonial
administrative class, but a permanent population. In any event, adopting a
colonial analysis simply demonstrates the doctrinal distinction in operation:
if one actually thought that Algeria was an integral part of France, the
1. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, 14
Dec. 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996).
2. France enacted the agreement under its own constitutional system; only after the
independence of Algeria were the terms of Evian - to the degree they were still relevant -
transferred into an international treaty. See Seung-Dae Kim, "Brief Report on the Special
Relationship between South and North Korea and the Realisation of the Rule of Law,"
Venice Commission, http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1998/CDL(1998)046-e.asp.
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doctrinally correct response would be democratization (as in South Africa),
not expulsion. But in part because of the expulsions, the colonial analysis is
necessary: those cases in which members of a political community are
expelled must be something other than expulsion or conquest.
Lastly, we might consider the termination of the Second World Word
in Europe. The six years of war created enormous demographic
dislocations, many of which were approved in the post-war settlements.
But those same settlements - from the initial capitulation to the 1990 final
peace treaty - also perfected or provided for additional demographic and
civic status changes of equal scale if not equal savagery. Between 12 and
14 million Germans were transferred westward (in some cases within
Germany, in others from other states such as Czechoslovakia 2); several
million Poles were transferred from areas of eastern Poland into the new
borders of postwar Poland. Some of these decisions, taken just after the
war, predate the crystallization of the contemporary norms on war. But
the expulsion of Germans was not actually completed until 1950, while
the final settlement that assigned the territory from which those Germans
fled to Poland and the Soviet Union was not signed until 1990.
As these three examples suggest, the conclusion of war does not only
perfect those events which occurred during the fighting, but also creates
entirely novel effects, both legal and political or factual. The do this, in
part, through the doctrinal patina of the voluntary sovereign act, but here
too, that act's proximate relationship to the violence and coercion of war
seems impossible to ignore. Yet the very fact that these demographic,
political and legal effects are created by international peace agreements
suggests their highly embedded and legitimated normative value.
V. War and the Rationale of Citizenship
Our initial, humane intuition might well be that of course we should
oppose these effects, as they constitute exceptions to the noble effort to
1. Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, Babelsberg (Ciicilienhof), 2 August 1945,
in BUNDESMINISTER DES INNERN, DOKUMENTE ZUR DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK: II REIHE,
BAND I, DIE KONFERENZ VON POTSDAM 2121-22 (1992); Treaty on the Final Settlement
with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 29 IL.M. 1186. See: Convention on the
Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, 26 May 1952, 6 U.S.T.
4117, as amended by Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 23 October 1954, entered into force 5 May 1955; Treaty of
Mutual Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, Czech Rep.-F.R.G., 11 December 1973, BGB1. II at 990, 13 IL.M. 19.
2. See: DE ZAYAS,1989.
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prohibit war. Yet in a world that is otherwise unprepared, unable, or
unwilling to actually prohibit war in fact, is it plausible to deny legal
sanction to war's effects? (Korman, 1996)
The earlier era in which the outright conquest of an alien people was
normatively possible also presented fewer compelling problems of
assimilation and political participation. But the end of aggression has
coincided with the rise of democratization - which brings with it
heightened concerns about the nature, quality, and identity of the polity,
now no longer subject but sovereign. Many of the nationalist projects of
the 19 h century directly linked projects of standardization and
homogenization to military modernization; there is no reason to think
that such incentives have disappeared, and it would hardly be surprising
to find even democratic societies responding to such incentives today in
constructing their citizenry. (Avant, 2000) Where states confront
demographic heterogeneity that directly or indirectly brings the
cohesiveness of their fighting forces into question - regardless of the
source - they presumably have a security interest in decreasing that
heterogeneity, or at least in increasing loyalty. The concern of the modern
warrior, more often, is not conquest of others but purification of the self -
the creation of an acceptable polity. And to this goal, the alchemy of
international norms provides a path. So it is not enough to seek greater
enforcement if the normative structure contains predictable mechanisms
for assimilation of what, in substance, one opposes.
The echoes of war in law and the normative order are fainter than and
qualitatively different from the previous, less mediated expression of war's
brutal operation. A world in which it was thought regrettable but not
illegal for a sovereign to slaughter its own people is certainly very
different from our world. But this difference should not deafen us to those
echoes, which suggest an unacknowledged but quite evident set of effects
directly ascribable to war and the particular way we terminate it,
assimilating those effects to a post-war dispensation.
Despite the doctrinal fixity of borders, states and their communities
are in continuous flux. The message conveyed by the official
transformation of wartime shifts in demography may signal the limits of
transnationalism and the minimum requirements of security that state
communities reserve to themselves, whatever their formal doctrinal
commitments. For all the limits we have placed upon it, even today war
continues to act, no so much in contravention of the normative structure,
but with and through it, to effect a more subtle conquest.
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